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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.   
Michael Hendrickson appeals his conviction for 
possession of contraband in prison, arguing that the evidence 
was insufficient to prove that he possessed a “prohibited 
object,” 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2), (d)(1)(F), or that he was an 
3 
“inmate of a prison,” id. § 1791(a)(2), (d)(4).  Because the 




Hendrickson was a pretrial detainee held on territorial 
charges in the custody of the Virgin Islands Bureau of 
Corrections (“BOC”).  The facility where Hendrickson was 
held houses both federal and territorial offenders, based on an 
agreement that the BOC has with the United States Marshals 
Service (“USMS”).     
 
During a routine pat-down, a corrections officer found 
a cell phone in Hendrickson’s pocket.  When the phone was 
activated, it displayed an AT&T logo and asked for a 
password.  The phone, however, was missing its SIM card, a 
removable chip that allows the phone to connect to a cellular 
network.  Without the SIM card, the phone was unable to 
receive calls and could make calls only to 911.  Hendrickson 
told the corrections officer that he had been using the phone as 
“an MP3 player,” a device used to play music.  App. 109.  
Because the phone was password-protected, the Government 
did not search the phone for text messages, emails, or other 
data.   
 
A jury found Hendrickson guilty of possession of prison 
contraband under 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2).  The District Court 
denied Hendrickson’s motions for a judgment of acquittal 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.  Hendrickson 




Hendrickson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
underlying his conviction,2 arguing that no reasonable juror 
could find that (1) the phone he possessed was a “prohibited 
object,” 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2), (d)(1)(F), or (2) he was “an 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3241 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612. We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
2 We review a sufficiency challenge de novo.  United 
States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 668 (3d Cir. 2012).  When 
deciding such a challenge, we apply a “particularly deferential 
standard of review.”  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 
(3d Cir. 1998).  We review the record “in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational 
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[] beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (alteration in 
original).  “We do not weigh evidence or determine the 
credibility of witnesses in making this determination.”  United 
States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003).  Rather, 
we view the evidence as a whole and “ask whether it is strong 
enough for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430. 
 
5 
inmate of a prison,” id. § 1791(a)(2), (d)(4).  Both claims lack 
merit.   





The prison-contraband statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1791, 
provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hoever . . . being an inmate 
of a prison . . . possesses . . . a prohibited object . . . shall be 
punished” as provided in the statute.  18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2).  
“[P]rohibited object[s]” include “a phone or other device used 
by a user of commercial mobile service (as defined in section 
332(d) of Title 47) in connection with such service.”  Id. 
§ 1791(d)(1)(F).  Section 332 is part of the Communications 
Act.  The Act defines a “commercial mobile service” as, 
generally speaking, a for-profit service that provides wireless 
access to the network of ten-digit telephone numbers used by 
most phones in North America.3  See 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) 
(defining “commercial mobile service” as a “mobile service . . . 
that is provided for profit and makes interconnected service 
available” to the public or other large group of users); id. 
§ 153(33) (defining “mobile service” as “a radio 
communication service” carried on between various stations or 
receivers); id. § 153(40) (defining “radio communication” as 
“the transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, 
and sounds”); id. § 332(d)(2) (defining “interconnected 
service” as a “service that is interconnected with the public 
switched network”); Mozilla Corp. v. F.C.C., 940 F.3d 1, 36 
                                              
 3 We do not opine whether this is the exclusive type of 
service contemplated by the term “commercial mobile service” 
in the Communications Act. 
6 
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that regulations have defined the 
“public switched network” as, broadly speaking, a network that 
provides access to the ten-digit, North American telephone-
numbering system (citing In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 
FCC Rcd. 311, ¶ 66)).   
 
In this case, we must determine whether the item that 
Hendrickson possessed was a “phone or other device used by 
a user of a commercial mobile service . . . in connection with 
such service.”  18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(1)(F).  Hendrickson argues 
that a phone is a prohibited object under this provision only if 
its commercial mobile service functions have previously been 
used and that his conviction should be reversed because there 
was no evidence that he ever used these functions.  
We disagree.   
 
Hendrickson’s argument depends on reading the word 
“used” in the phrase “phone or other device used by a user of 
commercial mobile service . . . in connection with such 
service,” 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(1)(F), to mean “previously 
used.”  Depending on the context, the past participle “used” 
can either (1) indicate the past tense of the verb “to use,” 
meaning that the applicable “device” must be one that was 
previously used in connection with commercial mobile service, 
or (2) serve as an adjective to describe the type of device 
covered by the statute, meaning that the “device” must be one 
that is generally used in connection with commercial mobile 
service.  See Bernal v. NRA Grp., LLC, 930 F.3d 891, 895 (7th 
Cir. 2019) (explaining that past participles can either “refer[] 
to a completed event” or “describe[] the present state of the 
nouns they modify,” depending on context (citing Henson v. 
Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1722 (2017); 
7 
Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 
33, 41 (2008))).    
 
The indefinite article “a” in the phrase “a user” implies 
that the word “used” in § 1791(d)(1)(F) is an adjective 
describing the type of “device” covered by the statute.  
18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(1)(F).  The indefinite article has a 
“generalizing force” on the noun that follows it, “user.”  
Campos-Hernandez v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 564, 570 (9th Cir. 
2018); see Am. Bus Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (citing, inter alia, Blacks Law Dictionary 1477 (6th ed. 
1990)).  It indicates that the phrase “a user” refers to users 
generally, rather than to one particular user.  See Shamokin 
Filler Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 772 
F.3d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that the phrase “the 
coal mine” refers to one “particular place,” whereas the phrase 
“a coal mine” refers to “a typical, paradigmatic, ‘usual’ coal 
mine” (quoting RNS Servs., Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 115 F.3d 
182, 185 (3d Cir. 1997))); see also McFadden v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 (2015) (“When used as an indefinite 
article, ‘a’ means ‘[s]ome undetermined or unspecified 
particular.’” (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 
1 (2d ed. 1954))); United States v. Alabama, 778 F.3d 926, 
932-35 (11th Cir. 2015) (interpreting the article “a” as a 
synonym for “any”); cf. Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F.3d 27, 36 
(1st Cir. 2017) (“As a matter of grammar, the word ‘any’ is not 
clearly more sweeping than is the word ‘an.’”), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2652 (2018).  The reference to “a typical, 
paradigmatic” user, Shamokin Filler Co., 772 F.3d at 336, 
indicates that Congress was focused on how the device is 
typically or commonly used, not whether the device had 
previously been used.  Thus, contrary to Hendrickson’s 
argument, § 1791(d)(1)(F) requires only that the applicable 
8 
device be one generally used for commercial mobile service.  
It does not require proof that the inmate—or anyone else—
actually used the device’s commercial mobile service 
functions.4   
                                              
4 We also conclude that the word “used” is an adjective 
because reading it as a past-tense verb would produce 
anomalous results.  The first subsection of § 1791(a) makes it 
a crime for any person to, “in violation of a statute or a rule or 
order issued under a statute, provide[] to an inmate of a prison 
a prohibited object.”  18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(1).  This provision 
has been invoked to prosecute guards and members of the 
public for passing contraband to prison inmates.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Akers, 476 F.3d 602, 603-04 (8th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Long, 122 F.3d 1360, 1361 (11th Cir. 1997).  
If “used” were a past-tense verb, then a visitor who slipped a 
cell phone to an inmate could not be convicted unless the 
Government could show that the device had previously been 
“used” in connection with its commercial mobile service 
capabilities.  What a person does with a phone before it is 
passed to a prison inmate, however, is of little concern to prison 
safety, compared with the threat that a phone poses once inside 
the prison.  Reading “used” as a past-tense verb, therefore, does 
not fit the statute’s purpose.  See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a word or phrase 
depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the 
purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any 
precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.”).   
9 
In sum, § 1791(d)(1)(F) prohibits the possession by 
inmates of devices, including cell phones, generally used to 
access commercial mobile service.5, 6    
                                              
5 The words “or other” between the words “phone” and 
“device” show that a “phone” is an example of the type of 
device that the statute covers.  18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(1)(F).  The 
word “other” usually indicates that the term that follows it is 
“of the same kind as the item or person already mentioned.”  
Other, Cambridge English Dictionary (2019) (online edition) 
(“Other can be used at the end of a list to show that there are 
more items without being exact about what they are.”); 
see also Other, Oxford English Dictionary § A.5.c (2019) 
(online edition).  Put differently, the word “other” often 
follows a specific example of the more general term that comes 
after it.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1726 (prohibiting unlawful 
collection of postage by “a postmaster or other person 
authorized to receive the postage of mail matter”); id. 
§ 1752(c)(1)(B) (referring to “the President or other person 
protected by the Secret Service”).  The word “other” in 
§ 1791(d)(1)(F) thus reflects Congress’s identification of a 
“phone” as an example of a “device used by a user of 
commercial mobile service . . . in connection with such 
service.”  18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(1)(F).   
Reading the entire clause, including the reference to 
commercial mobile service, further reveals that the word 
“phone” in § 1791(d)(1)(F) encompasses cell and mobile 
phones.  Compare Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 36 (noting that the 
definition of “commercial mobile service” includes a service 
that uses radio signals to make the telephone network available 
to the public (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1)-(3) and In re 
Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, ¶ 66)), with 





The evidence established that Hendrickson possessed a 
“phone” within the meaning of § 1791(d)(1)(F).  When a 
corrections officer found the phone on Hendrickson, the officer 
called an electronics technician, who confirmed that the device 
was “definitely” a phone.  App. 108.  A federal agent later 
examined the device, verified that it was able to power on, 
observed that it displayed an AT&T logo when starting up, and 
successfully made a call to 911 on it.  See United States v. 
Vera-Porras, 612 F. App’x 402, 405 (8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting 
defendant’s sufficiency challenge to this element and citing, 
inter alia, the T-Mobile logo on the phone and the jury’s 
“common sense that an operational cell phone bears the logo 
of its commercial carrier”).  This provided evidence sufficient 
                                              
as “a portable wireless telephone that transmits and receives 
signals via a cellular network”), and City of Jefferson City v. 
Cingular Wireless, LLC, 531 F.3d 595, 607 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(collecting definitions of “cell phone” and “telephone”).  We 
express no view as to whether the word “phone” in 
§ 1791(d)(1)(F) encompasses devices other than cell and 
mobile phones.   
6 We are aware of only one appellate case that has 
construed § 1791(d)(1)(F), United States v. Vera-Porras, 612 
F. App’x 402, 405 (8th Cir. 2015).  The opinion in that case 
assumed, without analysis, that a phone’s commercial mobile 
service functions must previously be “used” for the phone to 
be contraband—but the case made this assumption only 
because the evidence that the phone had previously been so 
used was overwhelming.  See id.  Vera-Porras, therefore, does 
not meaningfully inform our interpretation of the statute.     
11 
for a reasonable juror to conclude that the device confiscated 
from Hendrickson was a phone, as defined by § 1791(d)(1)(F).7    
  
For these reasons, the District Court correctly denied 
Hendrickson’s motion for a judgment of acquittal because the 
evidence was sufficient to prove that he possessed a 
“prohibited object” under § 1791(d)(1)(F).  





Hendrickson also argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he was an “inmate of a prison,” as 
defined under § 1791, because he was, at the time of the 
offense, detained on territorial charges in a territorial facility.  
In Hendrickson’s view, the statute applies only to inmates 
detained on federal charges or to inmates detained in federal 
facilities.  We disagree.   
 
To establish a violation of § 1791(a)(2), the 
Government must prove, among other things, that the 
defendant was “an inmate of a prison.” 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2).  
Section 1791(d)(4) defines a “prison” as “a Federal 
correctional, detention, or penal facility or any prison, 
                                              
7 Additionally, the jury heard evidence that the phone 
was password-protected and that a SIM card can be “[v]ery 
easily removed and very easily hidden.” App. 113.  From this, 
a reasonable juror could infer that the phone had a user who 
sought to protect its use and that the phone had contained a 
SIM card and, therefore, was capable of accessing commercial 
mobile service.   
12 
institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by 
direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the 
Attorney General.”  18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(4).  This term does 
not require the defendant to be detained pursuant to federal 
charges or to be detained in a federal facility.  Rather, the 
defendant need only be detained in a facility in which federal 
prisoners are held.  See id. § 1791(d)(4).  This language reflects 
Congress’s intent to extend the reach of § 1791 beyond federal 
prisoners and to capture the fellow inmates of federal 
prisoners. 
 
An examination of § 1791’s earlier iterations confirms 
this conclusion.  From 1986 until 2006, § 1791(d)(4) defined 
the term “prison” as “a Federal correctional, detention, or penal 
facility.”  18 U.S.C. § 1791 (1988) (amended 2006).  A 2006 
amendment with the header “[e]xpanded jurisdiction for 
contraband offenses in correctional facilities” added to the end 
of § 1791(d)(4) the words “or any prison, institution, or facility 
in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant 
to a contract or agreement with the Attorney General.”  
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, tit. XI, 
§ 1178, 119 Stat. 2960, 3126 (2006).  This amendment makes 
clear that Congress intended to extend the statute’s reach 
beyond federal prisoners and federal facilities.8   
                                              
8 When the federal criminal code was first codified into 
Title 18, § 1791 applied to any “Federal penal or correctional 
institution.”  An Act to Revise, Codify, and Enact into Positive 
Law Title 18 of the United States Code, Pub. L. No. 80-772, 
ch. 645, § 1791, 62 Stat. 683, 786 (1948).  A 1984 amendment 
replaced the word “institution” with the word “facility” (along 
with other changes to the statute).  See Continuing 
13 
This conclusion finds further support in the fact that 
§ 1791(d)(4) differs from other definitions of the term “prison” 
in the federal criminal code.  Section 1792, for example, 
prohibits prisoners from causing mutinies or riots, but it applies 
only to “Federal penal, detention, or correctional facilit[ies].”  
18 U.S.C. § 1792.  Other statutes follow a similar pattern.  See, 
e.g., id. § 1072 (“Whoever willfully harbors or conceals any 
prisoner after his escape from the custody of the Attorney 
General or from a Federal penal or correctional institution, 
shall be imprisoned not more than three years.”).  This shows 
that Congress knows how to limit the reach of the criminal law 
to federal prisoners and federal facilities when it wishes to do 
so.  See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2329 (2019) 
(interpreting statutory language in light of “the broader context 
of the federal criminal code”).   
 
There are also sound reasons for applying the 
contraband statute to all inmates in all facilities where federal 
prisoners are held.  In addition to cell phones, § 1791 prohibits 
inmates from possessing firearms, destructive devices, 
weapons, and drugs.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(1)(A)-(D).  Such 
contraband, when possessed by the co-inmates of federal 
prisoners—regardless of whether those co-inmates are 
                                              
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
§ 1109(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2147-48 (1984).  The definition was 
amended again in 1986, when it was revised to “a Federal 
correctional, detention, or penal facility.”  Criminal Law and 
Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-646, § 52(a), 100 Stat. 3592, 3607 (1986).  That remained 
the definition until the 2006 amendment.  This history reflects 
that Congress acted purposefully in expanding the reach of 
§ 1791 through the 2006 amendment.    
14 
themselves federal prisoners—endangers the safety of those 
federal prisoners.  Ensuring the safety of federal prisoners and 
those who guard them, regardless of where the federal 
prisoners are housed, is a goal advanced through the 2006 
amendment.  Cf. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 
137, 143 (2010) (referring to “Congress’ power to act as a 
responsible federal custodian,” which includes enacting laws 
for the safety of federal prisoners).   
 
For these reasons, we hold that the term “inmate of a 
prison” in § 1791(a)(2) is not limited to federal prisoners or to 




The evidence shows that Hendrickson was an “inmate 
of a prison” under § 1791.  At trial, a Deputy with the USMS 
                                              
9 We previously stated in dicta that § 1791 “applies only 
to federal prisons.”  United States v. Holmes, 607 F.3d 332, 
336 (3d Cir. 2010).  There, the question was whether an 
additional scienter requirement should be read into a part of the 
statute that prohibits the possession of weapons.  See id. at 335-
36.  We rejected the defendant’s argument because it was 
divorced “from any conceivable congressional concerns 
related to the presence of weapons in correctional institutions.”  
Id. at 336.  Specifically, we stated that the statute’s scienter 
requirements should be read narrowly because the statute 
“applies only to federal prisons,” where prison safety concerns 
are paramount.  Id.  This statement, which was made without 
any analysis of the text of § 1791(d)(4) and which was not 
essential to the case’s holding, pertains to the safety concerns 
of prisons generally, not just federal prisons.   
15 
testified that the USMS has a contract with the Virgin Islands 
BOC to house prisoners at Hendrickson’s facility.  He also 
testified that federal inmates are housed at Hendrickson’s 
facility and that he routinely transports these prisoners to and 
from the facility for federal court appearances.  This evidence 
provided a sufficient basis for a reasonable juror to find that 
Hendrickson was an inmate of a facility where persons were 
held “in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or 
agreement with the Attorney General.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1791(d)(4).10   Accordingly, Hendrickson was properly found 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.      
                                              
10 Hendrickson does not dispute that a prisoner 
agreement signed by the USMS is the equivalent of one signed 
by the “Attorney General” for purposes of § 1791(d)(4).  
See 28 U.S.C. § 561 (specifying that the USMS is a “bureau 
within the Department of Justice under the authority and 
direction of the Attorney General”).    
